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One of the most astounding characteristics of the pretrial stage of the
Iran-Contra prosecution1 was the enormous amount of classified informa-
tion involved.2 Both Oliver North and John Poindexter were intimately
familiar with the most secret aspects of the covert operations conducted by
the United States Government.' According to Independent Counsel Law-
rence E. Walsh, lives depend on maintaining the secrecy of some of the
information,4 yet there was much concern that it would be necessary to
disclose various sensitive classified documents in order to conduct a fair
trial.5 District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell threatened to dismiss the
case if the government did not produce all the relevant materials, regard-
less of the sensitivity of the documents."
At the heart of the controversy was the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act (CIPA).7 Passed by Congress in 1980, CIPA addresses the
growing problem of graymail in criminal prosecutions. Graymail, the tac-
tic of a defendant who threatens to disclose classified information in the
course of a prosecution, poses a dilemma for the government: The prose-
cutor must either allow the disclosure of classified information or dismiss
the charges against the defendant.' The Ninety-sixth Congress sought to
1. The defendants included former National Security Advisor John M. Poindexter, former White
House Aide Lt. Colonel Oliver L. North, retired Air Force Major General Richard V. Secord, and
Secord's business associate Albert A. Hakim.
2. Groner, Iran-Contra Trial Snagged on Classified Documents, Legal Times, Apr. 18, 1988, at
3, col. 2. More than 300,000 classified documents have been collected by the Independent Counsel. See
id. at 3, col. 1.
3. See Engelberg, When the Case for the Defense is Top Secret, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1988, at
8E, col. 2.
4. Walsh declared that disclosure of some of the secret information could expose agents and opera-
tives to "torture and death." TIME, May 9, 1988, at 45. Walsh told Judge Gesell that the CIA would
never release many of the requested classified documents. See North Trial Put Off Until After Elec-
tion, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 8, 1988, at 3, col. 5.
5. Judge Gesell ruled that the government must allow the defense to review the materials. See
North Trial Put Off Until After Election, supra note 4, at 3, col. 3.
6. Judge Gesell warned that "[u]nless [the disclosure] issue can be reconciled by various stipula-
tions or agreements . . . it's clear to me . . . that the conspiracy counts will have to be dismissed." No
More Documents, No More Charges, Says Iran-Contra Judge, L.A. Daily J., July 28, 1988, at 3, col.
1; see North Trial Put Off Until After Election, supra note 4, at 3, col. 5; see Coyle, A Logical
Choice, Nat'l L.J., May 30, 1988, at 27, col. 1.
7. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1982).
8. See Note, Graymail: The Disclose or Dismiss Dilemma in Criminal Prosecutions, 31 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 84 (1980).
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alleviate some of the risk of prosecuting charges involving classified infor-
mation by providing for pretrial procedures to resolve issues of discovery
and admissibility.
The Act has two primary provisions. First, under section 5, defendants
must notify the government if they intend to use classified information in
their defense.' Second, CIPA provides for pretrial hearings on discovery
and admissibility concerns. Section 4 allows in camera and ex parte reso-
lution of discovery issues."0 Section 6 provides for pretrial hearings on
admissibility. In one hearing, under section 6(a), the trial judge deter-
mines the relevance of the classified information,1 and in another hearing,
under section 6(c), the judge rules on the adequacy of substitutions offered
by the government to be admitted in lieu of the classified documents. 2
Much of the Iran-Contra pretrial proceedings focused on CIPA. Some
commentators warned that application of CIPA in the case would have
many pitfalls, including the possibility that the Act would prevent the case
from ever reaching trial." CIPA was at the center of the turmoil, given
the substantial risk of graymail in the case. 4
Previous case law, although sparse, has highlighted problems in inter-
preting the Act that may further complicate the task of judges managing
criminal cases involving classified information. The extent to which the
statute affects the discretion of judges in determining the relevance and
admissibility of classified materials is unclear. Some courts have balanced
the needs of the defendant against the interests of the government, 5 while
others have used common relevancy standards." After analyzing these
conflicting approaches, this Note suggests that the best resolution is to
preclude the judge from balancing the parties' competing interests in the
disclosure of classified information when ruling on relevance, but to allow
the court to strike such a balance when ruling on the adequacy of offered
substitutes and stipulations. Although most of the controversy addressed
9. 18 U.S.C. app. § 5.
10. 18 U.S.C. app. § 4.
11. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a).
12. 18 U.S.c. app. § 6(c).
13. See, e.g., Groner, supra note 2, at 4, col. 2 (GIPA "may be too cumbersome in a case that
involves hundreds of thousands of pages"). Even Judge Gesell expressed doubt about CIPA in this
extraordinary case. Id. at 4, col. 1. The sheer volume of the documents caused the trials to be delayed.
See North Trial Put Off Until After Election, supra note 4, at 3, col. 3.
14. See No More Documents, No More Charges, Says Iran-Contra Judge, supra note 6, at 3,
cols. 1-2; Coyle, supra note 6, at 27, col. 1.
15. E.g., United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987) (balancing parties' interests when
ruling on relevance and trial admissibility of classified information); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d
1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same); see infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
16. E.g., United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1985) (balancing improper when ruling
on relevance; court should rely on Federal Rules of Evidence); see the cases involving Edwin Wilson:
United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099 (1984); United States v.
Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1983),




here concerns the disclosure of information at trial, issues of discovery are
necessarily implicated.' 7 This Note suggests that Congress amend CIPA
to provide for a discovery process that functions in much the same manner
as the disclosure process, instructing courts to resolve issues of relevance
prior to addressing any claims of governmental privilege. After determin-
ing that certain classified information is discoverable without regard to its
classified status, the judge should consider questions of privilege in devel-
oping and evaluating alternative submissions.
By separating the relevance questions and the disclosure questions in
both the discovery and admissibility contexts, the relevance determinations
are isolated from government secrecy claims, lessening the danger of bias-
ing the judge against the defendant with nightmarish tales of national se-
curity problems. The security concerns will not go unheard, however, and
the government can take steps calculated to reduce the disclosure of highly
sensitive information by working with the court in fashioning alternatives
to full disclosure of the information. 8
I. DISCLOSE OR DISMISS: THE COSTS OF GRAYMAIL
The successful use of graymail in national security cases is particularly
harmful to the criminal justice process. As an Assistant Attorney General
noted:
[Graymail] foster[s] the perception that government officials and
private persons with access to military or technological secrets have a
broad de facto immunity from prosecution for a variety of crimes.
This perception not only undermines the public's confidence in the
fair administration of criminal justice but it also promotes concern
that there is no effective check against improper conduct by members
of our intelligence agencies."
Testifying before Congress, a Justice Department official estimated that
the desire of a defendant to discover or admit classified information at
17. The discovery procedures will dictate what informational pool exists for § 6 admissibility
determinations. "The best strategy available. . . is to try to weed out much of the classified material
under section 4 before such information is disclosed to the defendant and he has an opportunity to
enlarge his defense by using irrelevant details found in classified materials released to him." Office of
General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Experience Under the Classified Information Proce-
dures Act 8 (May 2, 1984) (internal memorandum) (on file at Yale Law Journal). According to CIA
attorney Fred Manget, the typical government response to a discovery request for classified informa-
tion is to invoke § 4 of CIPA to exclude as much evidence as possible under discovery rules, and then
use the machinery of CIPA §§ 5 and 6 to address any information ruled discoverable. Telephone
interview with Fred F. Manget, Assistant General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency (May
27, 1988).
18. For a valuable overview of CIPA, see Tamanaha, A Critical Review of the Classified Infor-
mation Procedures Act, 13 Am. J. CRim. L. 277 (1986)
19. S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 4294, 4297 [hereinafter S. RasP. No. 823] (statement of Philip Heymann, Assistant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
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trial affects between five and ten prosecutions each year. ° Even though
cases involving graymail are few, the Iran-Contra case illustrates that the
prosecutions are often significant.21 Crimes that have posed graymail
problems include espionage,22 drug offenses,2 3 gunrunning, 2  and even tax
evasion 5 and mail fraud.2
Notwithstanding these risks, graymail does not necessarily imply
wrongdoing. In certain situations, such as espionage prosecutions,
7
graymail may result legitimately and unavoidably from the preparation of
a criminal defense.2 8 Some practitioners contend that the main source of
the disclose-or-dismiss dilemma is not the unscrupulous defense attor-
ney, 2 but the government's own unwillingness to prosecute and its over-
classification of information. Thus, they regard the dilemma as largely
20. Use of Classified Information in Federal Criminal Cases: Hearings on H.R. 4736 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1980) [hereinafter Use of Classified Information] (statement of Philip Heymann). It is diffi-
cult to discover when a prosecution has been discontinued because of the threatened disclosure of
classified information. The Justice Department has taken steps to keep secret cases that have been
dismissed because of the graymail threat. See, e.g., Sylvester, Break in CIA-U.S. Attorney Bond, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 3, col. I (U.S. Attorney fired for disclosing that CIA had prevented prosecu-
tion from continuing for national security reasons).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1986) (espionage); United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, No. 86-323-K (D. Mass. Aug. 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)
(obstruction of justice); supra note 16 (the Wilson cases); infra note 33. For examples of successful
graymail tactics, see Alpern & Shannon, Cases of 'Graynail,' NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 1978, at 64.
22. The risk of disclosure of classified material is highest in espionage prosecutions because the
"standard of proof under . . . espionage statutes often requires the disclosure of the contents of the
classified document at issue." Note, supra note 8, at 92 n.49. The number of espionage cases has risen
dramatically in recent years, and indications are that the prosecutions will continue. See Record Year
Puts Spy-Catchers in Spotlight, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1985, at A24, col. 4 (between 1966 and
1975 no federal espionage prosecutions, between 1975 and 1985 49 prosecutions).
23. United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir.) (defendants convicted of drug offenses
sought discovery and examination of classified surveillance equipment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007
(1983).
24. United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant convicted of exporting fire-
arms sought discovery of classified CIA materials).
25. United States v. Diaz-Munoz, 632 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendants convicted of tax
evasion sought discovery of classified information regarding CIA's "Bay of Pigs" operation).
26. United States v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229 (D. Md. 1981) (defendant charged with mail fraud
and impersonating CIA officer sought to have classified information disclosed at trial).
27. Graymail Legislation, 1979: Hearings on H. 4736 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of
the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1979) [hereinafter Graymail
Legislation, 1979] (prepared statement of Philip Lacovara) ("As long as the basic elements of the
[espionage] offense. . . include the element of injury to national security, the government must place
evidence before the jury to establish that element. In addition, the defendant is entitled to place rebut-
tal evidence before the jury.").
28. Id. at 4 (prepared statement of Philip Heymann) ("[Wlholly proper defense attempts to ob-
tain or disclose classified information may present the government with the same 'disclose or dismiss'
dilemma.").
29. But see Graymail, S. 1482: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1980) [hereinafter Craymail, S. 14821 (statement
of Daniel Schwartz, former General Counsel, National Security Agency) (defendants routinely seek
sensitive information, regardless of relevancy, to force abandonment of prosecution).
30. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 75 (statement of Michael Scheininger, Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney); see A.B.A. COMM. ON LAW AND NAT'L SEC., LITIGATING NATIONAL SEcuRrrY
IssuEs 7 (Aug. 9, 1982) (statement of attorney Earl Silbert) (before CIPA, intelligence agencies reluc-
tant to recommend prosecutions involving classified information).
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illusory. 1 According to the government, the graymail problem results pri-
marily from the prosecutor's uncertainty as to whether the defendant will
seek to disclose classified material and how the judge will deal with such
information.82 Even though there is controversy as to the true cause of the
dilemma, those in charge of protecting national security information"3 and
those generally associated with civil liberty causes" view the graymail
problem as serious and worthy of attention."
II. CIPA AND THE AMBIGUITY OF THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
FOR ADMISSIBILITY AND DISCOVERY
A. CIPA
Congress designed CIPA as a procedural tool to reduce the effectiveness
of the graymail tactic. The Act was to provide the prosecution with the
opportunity to balance the harm to national security from prosecution and
disclosure of classified documents against the harm from abandonment of
prosecution. 6 The House Report on an early and substantially similar
version of CIPA stated that the legislation "is not intended to infringe on
a defendant's right to a fair trial or to change the existing rules of evi-
dence and criminal procedure."3 " In the language of the Eleventh Circuit,
the procedures simply aid in informing the government of "the 'price' the
defendant asserts the government will have to pay if the prosecution
continues." 8
Section 4 of CIPA provides for defense discovery of classified informa-
tion. The provision is an elaboration of a court's power under Federal
31. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 106-07 (prepared statement of Philip Laco-
vara) (dilemma often false because most classified information is over-classified).
32. See Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 156 (statement of General Counsel for
Central Intelligence Agency, Anthony Lapham); Use of Classified Information, supra note 20, at 4
(statement of Philip Heymann).
33. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 93 (prepared statement of Philip Lacovara)
("[While [graymail] affects a relatively small number of cases, they tend to be cases of unusual public
importance.").
34. For executive officials who perform or are even tangentially connected with the perform-
ance of intelligence functions, "graymail" can mean a virtual immunity from Federal criminal
investigation or prosecution "in the interests of national security"-even where criminal acts
performed under color of office deprive others of their constitutional rights.
From a civil liberties point of view, the rights of individuals cannot be fully and effectively
protected if such criminal conduct by Government officials cannot be investigated and prose-
cuted to the full extent of the law.
Graymail, S. 1482, supra note 29, at 49 (statement of Morton Halperin of ACLU).
35. See id. at 1-2 (statement of Senator Biden) (consensus among parties with diverse interests
regarding seriousness of graymail).
36. See S. REP. No. 823, supra note 19, at 4-5; H.R. REP. No. 831, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 11 (1980) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 831 pt. 1]; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1436, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1980) [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1436].
37. H.R. REP. No. 831, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3 (1980) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 831
pt. 2], see also H.R. REP. No. 831 pt. 1, supra note 36, at 11 (similar language).
38. United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983).
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Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) to determine issues of discovery.3"
Section 4 explicitly permits the court to grant, ex parte and in camera,
government requests to delete specific data from classified materials, or
substitute summaries or stipulations of facts.4° When section 4 is invoked,
a judge will determine the relevance of the information in light of the
asserted need for the information and any claimed government privilege.41
Under section 3 of CIPA, the court may issue a protective order forbid-
ding the defendant from revealing discovered classified information.4
Section 5 of CIPA requires that defendants notify the court and the
government when they expect to disclose classified information.4 The no-
tice must briefly describe in writing the information expected to be re-
vealed. Should the defendant fail to comply with section 5, the court may
issue sanctions, including suppressing the evidence that was subject to the
notice requirement."
After the defense has given notice, the government can request an in
camera hearing under section 6(a) to determine the relevance of evidence
that the defendant seeks to disclose at trial.45 Should the court conclude
that such evidence is relevant, the government can invoke section 6(c) of
CIPA and request the admission of a stipulation of facts or a summary of
the information in lieu of the specific classified information. The substitu-
tions, however, must provide the defendant with "substantially the same
ability to make his defense" as would the specific materials.4 6 With its
39. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 19, at 6; see United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st
Cir. 1984).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 425-28 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16, 17-18 (9th Cir.
1984); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158, 1162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
The § 5 discovery provision has been characterized by intelligence agency attorneys as "perhaps the
most important section of CIPA." Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Exper-
iences Under the Classified Information Procedures Act 4 (May 2, 1984) (internal memorandum) (on
file at Yale Law Journal).
41. In this regard, courts tend to act in much the same manner as they would have had CIPA not
been enacted. Compare United States v. Panas, 738 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1984) (non-CIPA discovery)
with United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984) (CIPA discovery).
42. 18 U.S.C. app. § 3.
43. See United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1200 (11th Cir. 1983). The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specify similar notice requirements. FED. R.
EvID. 412(c)(1) (notice required if defendant charged with rape intends to offer any evidence of
specific instances of alleged victim's prior sexual behavior); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (notice required
for use of alibi defense).
44. United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant prohibited from asserting
defense of CIA involvement because did not comply with § 5 notice requirement and demonstrated no
reasonable excuse), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1115 (1988). The sanction of forbidding defense testimony
when a defendant violates a notice requirement recently survived constitutional challenge before the
Supreme Court. Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 646 (defendant's deliberate and blatant failure to pro-
vide list of alibi witnesses justified sanction of excluding witnesses' testimony), reh'g denied, 108 S.
Ct. 1283 (1988). The CIPA notice provision has thus far survived constitutional scrutiny. See infra
notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199-1200
(11th Cir. 1983) (articulating need for notice requirement of § 5).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099
(1984).
46. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1).
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request for alternative disclosures, the government may submit an affida-
vit both certifying that disclosure would damage the national security and
explaining the basis for classification of the materials."" If the government
requests, the court shall review the affidavit in camera and ex parte.4"
Thus far, CIPA has withstood constitutional attack,4" including challenges
in the Iran-Contra prosecution.5"
B. Case Articulation of the Evidentiary Standard for Discovery and
Admissibility
It is often repeated that Congress did not intend CIPA to change any
substantive rules of evidence. 51 The legislative history of the Act confirms
that the drafters sought to avoid altering the standards for admissibility of
evidence at trial.52 Although clearly not created to change the standard for
the admissibility of evidence, CIPA did not articulate the preexisting stan-
dard either. After grappling at great length with the issue of the eviden-
tiary standard during hearings, Congress concluded only that the current
standard, whatever that might be, should remain in force.5"
Because Congress did not expressly define the current evidentiary stan-
47. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(2).
48. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(2).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984) (§ 5 notice requirements),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 976 (4th Cir. 1983) (Fifth
Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses); United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (6th Cir.) (§ 4 discovery provisions
violate neither Fifth Amendment right to fair trial nor Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983); United States v. Collins, 603 F. Supp. 301 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (§
6(c) alternative disclosure provision not violative of Sixth Amendment compulsory process, due pro-
cess, or equal protection); United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(CIPA definitions for national security and classified information not void for vagueness); United
States v. Jolliff, 548 F. Supp. 229, 231 (D. Md. 1981) (§ 5 notice requirements not violative of Fifth
Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination).
50. See Coyle, Full Speed Ahead for D.C. Probes, Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1988, at 10, col. 2 (§ 5
notice requirements).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Collins, 720
F.2d at 1199; Note, United States v. Smith: Construing the Classified Information Procedures Act as
Restricting the Admissibility of Evidence, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV., 720, 721 & n.10 (1987); supra
note 37 and accompanying text. By providing a framework in which the rules of evidence are to
operate, however, CIPA inevitably affects the application of the rules (for example, the timing of the
invocation of the rules). See infra text accompanying note 118; infra note 134 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 823, supra note 19, at 8 ("A defendant should not be denied the use of
information that he would otherwise use simply because of the procedures of this bill .... [T]he
committee intends to retain [the] current [standard for admissibility], regardless of the sensitivity of the
information."); H.R. REP. No. 831 pt. 1, supra note 36, at 14-15 (similar language); H.R. REP. No.
831 pt. 2, supra note 37, at 3 (similar language); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1436, supra note 36, at 12
(similar language).
53. See GRAYMAIL, S. 1482, supra note 29, at 4. A House Intelligence Committee report on
CIPA, however, did address the issue of a state secrets privilege, and specifically rejected the notion
for criminal trials. In a footnote the report said: "[I]t is well-settled that the common law state secrets
privilege is not applicable in the criminal arena. To require, as some have suggested, that a criminal
defendant meet a higher standard of admissibility when classified information is at issue might well
offend against this principle." H.R. REP. No. 831 pt. 1, supra note 36, at 15 n.12; see Tamanaha,
supra note 18, at 367 n.272.
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dards and seemingly left the task to the courts," it is instructive to take a
brief look at the competing discovery and trial admissibility rules.
1. Discovery: Common Law "Government Privilege"
In cases involving the discovery of classified, or unclassified but sensi-
tive, government information, courts have relied on Roviaro v. United
States5" in developing a doctrine of governmental privilege. In Roviaro,
the defendant sought disclosure of the identity of a government informer
who witnessed and participated in the illegal activities with which the
defendant was charged. The information was not classified. The Supreme
Court allowed the discovery, but only after recognizing a governmental
privilege "to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of
that law.""6 Although allowing for defense discovery of the information,
the Court's language suggested that the defendant's need for the informa-
tion should be balanced against the potential damage done by disclosure,
and that the evidence must be more than simply relevant to be discovered
and admitted at trial:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifia-
ble. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in
protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to
prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure
erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses,
the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other rele-
vant factors.57
The Court in Roviaro placed limits on the privilege. Under Roviaro, the
government cannot prosecute a defendant without disclosing information
"relevant and helpful" to the defendant, regardless of whether or not the
government has a weighty interest in maintaining the secrecy of that in-
formation.58 Roviaro has been extended beyond cases involving the iden-
tity of informants. The government privilege has been used to deny dis-
54. See infra notes 80, 121-23 and accompanying text. But see Note, supra note 51, at 732
(arguing that CIPA prohibits courts from modifying evidence discovery and admissibility standards).
55. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
56. Id. at 59.
57. Id. at 60.
58. Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
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covery of sensitive surveillance techniques and equipment59 and classified
documents. 0
2. Trial Admissibility: Federal Rules of Evidence and Common Law
"Government Privilege"
One fundamental standard in CIPA trial admissibility cases, Federal
Rule of Evidence 401, defines relevant evidence as that which tends "to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.""1 Some courts have explicitly used this standard in evaluating
evidence sought to be disclosed under CIPA,62 while others have applied
standards that are operatively equivalent to rule 401."
In addition, the Second Circuit has applied rule 403 in a CIPA case."
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for exclusion if the probative value
of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.65 The Second Cir-
cuit used rule 403 in affirming a lower court's preclusion of classified
information that the defendant sought to admit, as falling "under gener-
ally applicable evidentiary rules of admissibility."66 And, although on its
face limited to discovery requests, the Roviaro government privilege has
been applied in determining trial admissibility of classified information.6
The extension is not without its critics.68
59. E.g., United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1507 (1lth Cir.) (information concerning
placement of hidden microphone privileged), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854 (1986); United States v.
Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (location of police officer's observation post privileged);
see United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1078 (4th Cir. 1988) (balancing parties' interests and
denying discovery).
60. E.g., United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 428 (1st Cir. 1984) (Roviaro applied to CIPA §
4 discovery proceedings concerning classified surveillance information); see also United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (balance permitted in CIPA § 4 discovery proceedings);
United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1461, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987) (balance used in applying For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act in discovery request), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1115 (1988); Govern-
ment's Preliminary Statement at 17, 19-24, United States v. Clegg, No. CR83-51R (W.D. Wash.),
affd, 740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984) (government requests court to balance in CIPA § 4 discovery
proceedings).
61. FED. R. EvID. 401.
62. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 586 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 401), affd, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).
63. E.g., United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (court applied materiality
standard, stating that evidence can be "material, whether or not it might ultimately be persuasive");
United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir.) ("[Wle conclude that the district court correctly
found this evidence inadmissible under the ordinary rules of evidence, separate and apart from any
CIPA consideration."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099 (1984).
64. Wilson, 750 F.2d at 9.
65. FED. R. Evi. 403. It is doubtful that the "unfair prejudice" in rule 403 is intended to refer
to prejudicing the government's interest in nondisclosure of the classified document. The language
refers to unfairly prejudicing the judge or jury. See Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 37
(statement of Philip Heymann).
66. Wilson, 750 F.2d at 9.
67. United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987) (remanded to allow government asser-
tion of Roviaro privilege in CIPA § 6(a) relevance hearing); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102
(4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Roviaro applied to CIPA § 6(a) relevance hearing).
68. E.g., Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 70 (statement of Michael Tigar); id. at
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C. The Congressional Intention as to Evidentiary Standards for
Admissibility
Congress did not attempt to codify any single evidentiary standard for
trial admissibility. Nevertheless, an analysis of the testimony given before
Congress during the debate on the different versions of CIPA and an ex-
amination of the statute itself may give clues as to the intent of the
legislature.
After several years of examining the graymail problem," Congress be-
gan considering different versions of CIPA, two in the House, 0 and one
in the Senate." The administration proposed a version of CIPA that dif-
fered from the Murphy House bill and the Biden Senate bill in major
ways. Because much of the testimony relevant to admissibility standards
for classified information was provoked by the administration's bill, it is
instructive to concentrate on that version of CIPA.
1. The Higher Relevance Standard for Admissibility
Unlike the Murphy House bill and the Biden Senate bill, the adminis-
tration's bill called for a "relevant and material" standard for resolving
relevancy and admissibility issues in the section 6(a) hearing. Referring to
the administration standard as "a touch, a half-step more than mere rele-
vance," 7 then-Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann testified that
the addition of the word "material" requires "more than that the evidence
in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the issues in the
case. It requires that the evidence be of significance to the defendant's
case."
73
Although drawing from the "relevant and helpful" test of Roviaro, the
44 (statement of Morton Halperin). But see infra notes 73, 90-91 and accompanying text.
69. Debate in Congress on the problems of graymail and potential solutions began as early as
1978. See NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 32 (1978).
70. Congressman Murphy introduced the first bill, on July 11, 1979. H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). On February 12, 1980, the House Intelligence Committee unanimously reported the bill,
as amended, to the House. Use of Classified Information, supra note 20, at 1. Ultimately, it was the
Murphy bill that was largely adopted. Congressman Rodino introduced the second bill, prepared by
the administration. H.R. 4745, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
71. Senator Biden introduced a version of CIPA on July 11, 1979. S. 1482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). On May 20, 1980, the Judiciary Committee passed the bill by a unanimous vote. S. REP. No.
823, supra note 19, at 3.
72. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 22 (statement of Philip Heymann); see also
id. at 39 ("All we are asking for is that there be a touch more than marginal relevance, that it be
something more than an argument that . . . a law school professor could make that perhaps it was
relevant.").
73. Id. at 8-9. The administration justified this higher standard by arguing that "[slince the pub-
lic interest in protecting the confidentiality of classified information is at least as substantial as the
interest in protecting the identities of law enforcement informants, the Roviaro decision demonstrates
that a more demanding standard than relevance should be employed to govern the disclosure of classi-
fied information." Id. at 11.
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administration disavowed any intent to provide for balancing of the par-
ties' interests in determining the admissibility of classified evidence. Hey-
mann testified that "[t]he administration bill does not require or permit
the value of evidence to the defendant to be weighed against the harm of
disclosure to the national security."' Its adoption of Roviaro extended
only to the requirement that classified material meet the heightened rele-
vance test. 5
Congress was aware that the extension of Roviaro was not universally
applauded. At the hearings, the administration's use of the case provoked
several strong criticisms from witnesses who argued that Roviaro did not
consider admissibility issues and is limited to the informant context." Yet
courts have generally disagreed with critics' assessments of Roviaro and
have extended its holding to allow a limited government privilege in cases
dealing with sensitive information." The enacted version of CIPA does
not contain the administration's proposed "relevant and material" lan-
guage. In fact, CIPA does not refer to any standard at all, providing only
that the judge determine all the issues regarding "use, relevance, or ad-
missibility" of classified information. 8
Even in the wake of the criticism of the higher test proposed by the
administration, it was not clear what standard was the current standard.
Both proponents and opponents of the Roviaro higher relevancy test noted
the confusion surrounding the standards courts use to determine admissi-
bility.7 ' Congress knew that rejecting the administration's language would
not necessarily preclude courts from using the Roviaro standard. 80 Con-
gress simply left it up to the judicial branch to develop the appropriate
evidentiary test, and stated only that the current standard was not changed
by CIPA.81
74. Id. at 9.
75. The distinction between higher relevance and balancing is often overlooked by the courts and
commentators. See, e.g., Note, supra note 51, at 733 & n.112; infra note 91.
76. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 69 (statement of attorney Michael Tigar); id.
at 133-34 (statement of Georgetown Law Center Professor William Greenhalgh).
77. E.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Roviaro balancing
applied in § 6(a) relevancy hearing); United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1985) (Roviaro
balancing applied in § 6(c) alternative disclosure hearing); see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text (Roviaro balancing applied in discovery decisions).
78. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(a).
79. Compare Graymail, S. 1482, supra note 29, at 10 (statement of Philip Heymann ) ("To be
frank, I don't think that either of us can say that the standard of relevant and material is the present
law or relevant is the present law.") with id. at 44 (statement of Morton Halperin) ("It is obviously
very confused as to what the standard is, both for discoverability of material and admissibility.").
80. Use of Classjfled Information, supra note 20, at 7 (statement of Philip Heymann) (suggesting
that rejection of administration language meant that Congress had concluded "it was sensible to leave
[alteration of evidentiary standards] simply for judicial determination."); see Graymail Legislation,
1979, supra note 27, at 35 (statement of Philip Heymann) (inclusion of administration's language
helpful but not necessary to argue that Roviaro applies). Some argue that CIPA does not prohibit
Roviaro balancing because Roviaro was good law at the enactment of CIPA and Congress did not
amend any law of evidence. E.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106 & n.8 (4th Cir. 1985)
(en banc). But see Note, supra note 51, at 733.
81. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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2. The Classification Affidavit
The administration's bill also differed from the Biden Senate bill in
that it required the government to submit an affidavit explaining why the
material was classified.82 Under the administration's scheme, the affidavit
would be submitted to the court prior to the court's determination of the
admissibility of the classified materials.
The administration argued that its version would allow the judge to
make a more informed decision and determine if the material was prop-
erly classified. 83 Morton Halperin of the ACLU disagreed, arguing that
the affidavit would be prejudicial because it would "permit the decision on
relevance to be colored by the claims of national security, exaggerated or
real, made by the government."" Furthermore, opponents contended, the
judge does not need to know why the information is classified in order to
rule on admissibility. The sole purpose of the affidavit, one opponent tes-
tified, "is to scare the hell out of the district judge and to make him or her
think that the information is so important that if she or he makes a mis-
step on the defendant's side as opposed to the prosecution's side irrepara-
ble damage will be caused to the country."85 The government contended
that without knowing the reasons for the classification of the materials,
the judge would be unable to determine relevance issues or to create fair
substitutions and stipulations to the sensitive information.8
Congress rejected the administration's proposal with regard to the stage
at which the classification affidavit may be filed with the court. The en-
acted bill provides for such an affidavit only in the section 6(c) hearing on
alternative disclosures.8" The legislative history of the Act explicitly rules
out balancing the parties' interests in disclosure. The Senate Report states,
"[ilt should be emphasized, however, that the court should not balance the
national security interests of the government against the rights of the de-
fendant to obtain the information."" Congress agreed with the adminis-
tration that the judge should not operate ignorant of the reasons behind
the government's desire to submit alternatives to the classified material.8
82. H.R. 4745, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(b) (1979). The Murphy House bill also contained an
analogous provision allowing the government to show the basis for the classification before a judge
rules on relevancy. H.R. 4736, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(b) (1979).
83. Graymail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 20-21 (statement of Philip Heymann).
84. Id. at 43.
85. Id. at 71 (statement of Michael Tigar).
86. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 19, at 7. Apparently, the basis for the administration's support
of the affidavit provision was not the affidavit's value as an informational tool in balancing party
interests. The administration did not propose the adoption of a balancing test at all. See supra notes
72-75 and accompanying text.
87. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(2).
88. S. REP. No. 823, supra note 19, at 9.
89. The House Committee on Intelligence report on the first version of CIPA presented to the
House noted that the ex parte submission of a classification affidavit "is not intended to sway the
judge's deliberations as to the adequacy of the proposed statement or summary; rather it is intended as
a predicate for requesting such substitutes and as an aid to the court in understanding the language
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Congress thus provided that the government may submit a damage assess-
ment after the court has determined that the evidence is relevant.
III. CIPA AND THE JUDICIARY
A. Discovery Under CIPA Section 4 and Balancing
Circuit courts have applied Roviaro balancing when resolving issues of
discovery of classified information. For example, the First Circuit in
United States v. Pringlego affirmed the lower court's holding that the clas-
sified materials the defendant sought in discovery should not be made
available. While ruling that the information was not relevant to the de-
fense, the lower court also applied the Roviaro balancing test and "con-
cluded that the national security would be damaged if the information and
materials sought were disclosed to the defendants or the public."91 The
Ninth Circuit has engaged in similar balancing. 2
Although most of the controversy surrounding the use of Roviaro bal-
ancing arises from its application in admissibility rulings, many of the
same concerns are pertinent to the discovery process. Those issues are
identified below.
B. Trial Admissibility Under CIPA Section 6 and Balancing
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Smith, ruled that, in section
6(a) "use, relevance, and admissibility" hearings, the trial judge should
balance the defendant's need to disclose classified information at trial
chosen for the summary statement." The report reiterated the intent that "the admissibility rulings
required by section 102 [comparable to CIPA § 6(a)] be prior to and distinct from the ruling on a
section 103 [comparable to CIPA § 6(c)] motion." H.R. REP. No. 831 pt. 1, supra note 36, at 20.
90. 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 426. Although the Court of Appeals did not explicitly approve the balancing in the
lower court's analysis, and instead addressed, with approval, the use of the Roviaro "relevant and
helpful" test, it is probable that the court also approved balancing. See United States v. Sarkissian,
841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting Pringle as approving balancing); Smith, 780 F.2d at
1109-10 (same).
92. United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984). Clegg was charged with various offenses
based on the sale of arms to Pakistan. He alleged that the weapons were intended to aid Afghanistan
"freedom fighters." Brief of Appellant at 12, 23 n.3, United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir.
1984) (No. 83-3126); see United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1988). Clegg sought discov-
ery of classified material to establish approval of the transfer. In a § 4 statement, submitted to the
court in camera and ex parte, the prosecution urged the judge "to consider the sensitivity of the
classified material in relation to the speculative nature of the assertions made by the defense." Gov-
ernment's Preliminary Statement at 17, United States v. Clegg, No. CR83-51R (W.D. Wash.), affld,
740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984). According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the information specified
in the defense discovery request "struck a tangential matter that the government must protect." Office
of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Experiences Under the Classified Information Pro-
cedures Act 10 (May 2, 1984) (internal memorandum) (on file at Yale Law Journal). Thus, although
not expressly balancing the interests of the parties, the court had before it the necessary information to
compare the potential damage of discovery with the defendant's need for the materials. Clegg, 740
F.2d at 17. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that the materials sought were
discoverable. Id. at 18; see also United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (upholding finding that materi-
als should be admitted at trial).
19881
The Yale Law Journal
against the government's interest in keeping the materials out of the pub-
lic domain.9 Accused of selling details of Army double agent operations to
a Soviet agent, Richard Smith was indicted on five counts of violating the
Espionage Act." As part of his trial defense, Smith sought to establish
that he reasonably believed he had acquired legal authority to sell the
information.95 Smith invoked CIPA by notifying the government of his
intent to disclose classified information at trial to establish his defense."
In a section 6(a) hearing, the district court ruled that certain classified
information could be introduced at trial.97
Initially, on an interlocutory appeal, a panel on the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court that the classified information
Smith sought to disclose was admissible.9" Judge Butzner, writing for the
panel, noted that the Act did not alter the substantive rules of evidence
regarding trial admissibility99 and that "if Congress had intended the dis-
trict court to balance national security against relevancy in the [section]
6(a) hearing, provision would have been made for transmission of infor-
mation necessary for balancing during the [section] 6(a) hearing and not
after relevancy and admissibility have been determined."1 ' The original
panel rejected the government's argument that the privilege of Roviaro
applied. The court distinguished Roviaro by noting that the Roviaro court
had the information necessary to balance and that it placed limits on the
privilege when the information is relevant and helpful.101
The panel decision was subsequently vacated, and an en banc review
was granted. 0 ' The en banc court vacated the trial court's findings as to
admissibility and remanded for Roviaro balancing. The court majority at-
tempted to reconcile its holding with the explicit legislative history forbid-
ding the balancing of competing interests by arguing in a footnote that
"we do not read into the Senate Report a necessary inconsistency, and
construe it as we do the House Report to mean any balancing not already
required by existing law."' 3 Arguing next that the "trial court is re-
quired to balance the public interest in nondisclosure against the defend-
ant's right to prepare a defense," the court cited Roviaro as authority,
93. 780 F.2d 1102, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
94. United States v. Smith, 592 F. Supp. 424, 427 (E.D. Va.), affid, 750 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
95. Id. at 428.
96. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1103.
97. The trial court found the classified information relevant to Smith's defense under the princi-
ples of Federal Rule of Evidence 401. Id. at 1104.
98. United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215 (1984), rev'd, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en
bane).
99. Id. at 1217.
100. Id. at 1218.
101. Id. at 1219.
102. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
103. Id. at 1106 n.8.
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claiming that it was not extending that holding.10" The dissent, written by
Judge Butzner, essentially restated the original panel decision,10 5 arguing
in addition that the rejection of the administration's bill illustrated the
legislative intent to prevent judicial balancing of party interests."°6 The
dissent also argued that Roviaro is limited to discovery requests and does
not cover information possessed by the defendant.
10 7
Recently, in United States v. Zettl,05 the Fourth Circuit again ruled
that Roviaro balancing should be applied in the section 6(a) hearing. Re-
lying on Smith, the court held that the trial judge need not postpone con-
siderations of national security until after the relevancy determination. 0 9
Courts have thus applied Roviaro reasoning to both discovery and ad-
missibility of classified information. 10 Assuming Congress understood the
current state of evidence law, the Smith and Zettl courts probably violated
the intent of Congress when they allowed trial courts to balance the de-
fendant's need for disclosure against the interests of national security in
section 6(a) relevancy hearings.
In addition to the conflict with legislative will, balancing should not
occur in the section 6(a) hearing for procedural reasons. In that hearing,
the judge is directed to determine the relevance of the classified informa-
tion listed in the defendant's notice. The government does not submit the
classification affidavit until the section 6(c) alternative disclosure hearing.
CIPA does not even provide for a section 6(c) hearing until the trial judge
104. Id. at 1107.
105. See id. at 1111 (Butzner, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 51, at 729-35 (ex-
pounding Judge Butzner's dissent).
106. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1112 (Butzner, J., dissenting). During the drafting of CIPA, even the
administration claimed it was not introducing a balancing standard in its bill. See supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text. The administration's bill enunciated a test like that in Roviaro only to the
extent that Roviaro raised the relevancy standard; it did not suggest an evaluation of the harm of
disclosure. Congress never had the opportunity to reject any Roviaro balancing proposals.
107. Smith, 780 F.2d at 1113 (Butzner, J., dissenting). Even Judge Butzner presumably would
allow Roviaro balancing under CIPA discavery requests. As he argued in his dissent: "This is clearly
explained in United States v. Pringle, on which the majority relies. There the court pointed out that
none of the defendants 'possessed classified information which they threatened to disclose. Quite to the
contrary, they were seeking classified information which the government sought to protect.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427 (1st Cir. 1984)) (footnote omitted).
108. 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).
109. The case is astounding because the government interpreted the en banc Smith decision to
forbid balancing in the § 6(a) hearing and to permit privilege claims only in the § 6(c) hearing. Zettl,
835 F.2d at 1062-67. Despite the efforts of the trial judge, the government insisted on this misreading
of Smith throughout the § 6(a) hearings. Id. at 1062. The trial court judge eventually acquiesced and
ruled that the material was relevant without considering possible government privileges. In the § 6(c)
alternative disclosure hearing, the trial judge held that the government provided inadequate substi-
tutes, id. at 1063, and ruled the material admissible. On appeal, the case was remanded for further
§ 6(a) proceedings with the application of the same type of balancing allowed in the en banc Smith
decision. Id. at 1066. The charges against Zettl's co-defendants were subsequently dropped to mini-
mize the public disclosure of classified material. See U.S. Drops All Charges Against 2 in GTE Case,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1988, § 1, at 36, col. 5.
110. The courts are split on the issue of Roviaro balancing in § 6(a) relevancy hearings. Compare
United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987) (balancing appropriate) and United States v.
Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (same) with United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256
(11th Cir. 1985) (balancing inappropriate).
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has ruled the classified information admissible in the section 6(a) proceed-
ing.111 Given that the court does not even have the necessary information
to balance until the section 6(c) alternative evidence hearing, the judge
certainly should not weigh competing interests in the antecedent section
6(a) relevancy hearing.
IV. RESOLUTION: A Two LEVEL APPROACH
CIPA should be clarified to establish two sets of parallel evidentiary
tests: the first to deal with discovery requests for classified information; the
second to rule on admissibility of classified materials made available to the
defendant. Although seemingly reversed in order, this Note will first ad-
dress trial admissibility determinations, and then focus on the discovery
process. The need to alter discovery procedures will become apparent only
after a discussion of the trial admissibility modifications.
A. Admissibility Rulings
1. Level One: Relevancy Determination
The court should determine relevance according to the ordinary rules of
relevance and admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, without
regard to the classified status or sensitivity of the materials. The structure
of CIPA makes Roviaro balancing impractical at this stage of the pro-
ceedings. In addition, limiting the scope of the judicial inquiry to the ma-
teriality of the information to the defense will minimize the potential prej-
udicial effect of the national security horror stories.
For the purpose of ruling on the materiality of information to the de-
fendant's case in the section 6(a) relevance hearing, there is no need for
the court to evaluate the harm of disclosing any particular document. The
relevance determination is independent of governmental interests.
2. Level Two: Alternative Disclosures and Roviaro Balancing
If the trial judge deems the material relevant, the government must ac-
quiesce to the admission of the information at trial in some form accept-
able to the court" 2 or risk dismissal of the charges related to the evidence.
The government should be permitted both to offer alternatives to the orig-
inal materials and to provide the court with the reasons for the classifica-
tion or the sensitivity of the information." 3 Creating substitutes for origi-
111. See A.B.A. COMM. ON LAW AND NAT'L SEc., LITIGATING NATIONAL SECDRVIY ISSUES
5-6 (Aug. 9, 1982) (statement of attorney Earl Silbert).
112. Under CIPA, the judge can admit substitutes for relevant classified material if the substitutes
"provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense' when compared to the
original materials. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1).
113. The defendant should also be permitted to offer substitutes for the original classified materi-
als See United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1063 k4th Cir. 1987).
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nal classified materials necessarily entails an understanding of why a
particular deletion or summarization is needed."1 4 The court should then
balance the defendant's need for the original form of the information
against the government's interest in preventing disclosure of the original
material.115 Balancing should aid the judge only in determining what
form to admit the classified information. This procedure reduces the prej-
udicial effect of allowing national security concerns to permeate the rele-
vancy determination.
Roviaro balancing has a legitimate function outside of the discovery
context.""6 Because the prosecution of those who have been involved with
intelligence agencies is especially susceptible to graymail and those de-
fendants may not need to rely on the discovery mechanism to obtain classi-
fied information, limiting Roviaro balancing to discovery significantly
weakens CIPA. If used as forwarded here, the legitimacy and value of
Roviaro balancing extends beyond the bounds of discovery.
117
The CIPA scheme can be applied consistently with this approach. The
Act provides for a bifurcated process. The judge determines relevancy in
the section 6(a) hearing in camera after the defendant has filed notice.
Only if the material has been found to be relevant will the court turn to
the issues surrounding alternatives to the information. As the Eleventh
Circuit held in United States v. Juan, "[i]n appraising materiality [in the
Section 6(a) hearing], the court is not to consider the classified nature of
the evidence. . . .However, in passing upon a motion under Section 6(c)
the trial judge should bear in mind that the proffered defense evidence
does involve national security."'1 8 In addition, should the government re-
fuse to reveal classified information ruled admissible, the defendant's right
to a fair trial may require dismissal of the charges related to the nondis-
closed materials.1 9
3. Reconciling Roviaro Balancing in Admissibility Rulings and Con-
gressional Intent
One can reconcile balancing in CIPA procedures and the express Con-
gressional intent against balancing, as the Smith majority did, by arguing
114. See supra notes 86, 89 and accompanying text.
115. See Grayvnail Legislation, 1979, supra note 27, at 122 (statement of Philip Lacovara).
116. The prosecutions involving vast amounts of classified information previously disclosed to de-
fendants by virtue of past government employment (such as the Iran-Contra case) would be plagued
by graymail problems if Roviaro balancing was limited to discovery requests. See supra notes 1-6,
13-15 and accompanying text.
117. "The government's interest is still protectable although [the defendant] may have had access
to the information. The privilege is not extinguished by previous disclosure to the defendant alone.
The government interest to be protected here includes disclosure of the information to the public."
Smith, 780 F.2d at 1109.
118. United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11 th Cir. 1985); see Graymail Legislation, 1979,
supra note 27, at 21 (statement by Rep. McClory) (similar language).
119. CIPA provides for sanctions, including the dismissal of charges. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(2).
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that the legislature intended to prevent more balancing than existed prior
to the enactment of CIPA.12 ° A more plausible argument, however, is that
Congress never intended to freeze the standard by passing CIPA; rather,
it intended CIPA to function solely as a procedural measure.12'
No evidence suggests that Congress intended to prevent the altering of
the relevancy and admissibility standards by enacting CIPA.'22 Should the
courts determine that an evidentiary doctrine should not be extended to
cover a certain situation, CIPA is not a basis for arguing in favor of the
extension. Conversely, if the courts determine that an evidentiary rule
should be extended or altered, CIPA does not forbid the change.'23 The
development of evidentiary standards (including the extension of Roviaro)
should continue as the courts deem necessary, with CIPA as the frame for
proceedings that implement the developing rules of evidence.
B. Discovery Rulings
CIPA should be modified to provide for the same type of bifurcation in
section 4 discovery hearings as is now in place for section 6 hearings. By
amending section 4 to include an in camera ruling on the relevance of
requested material without regard to its classified status, and by providing
for balancing when ruling on suggested alternative disclosures, the discov-
ery process and the admissibility process will act in parallel.
1. Level One: Relevancy Determination
Currently, government challenges of classified information discovery
based on national security claims are made simultaneously with challenges
of the information's relevance to the defense.' 2" The two considerations
should be treated separately. 25
120. United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1985) (en bane). In addition,
indicating that the considerations of relevance should be kept separate from consideration of the harms
that disclosure could cause, the bifurcation of procedures can be seen as underscoring Congressional
rejection of the contention that Roviaro balancing is appropriate in determining relevancy. Smith, 780
F.2d at 1111 (Butzner, J., dissenting). On the other hand, the bifurcation also indicates that balancing
is appropriate to determine in what form the relevant classified materials will be presented at trial.
121. See United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983).
122. By creating CIPA, Congress was not speaking to the dynamics of evidentiary relevancy stan-
dards at all, and did not enact CIPA with an eye towards establishing affirmative legislative authority
for judicial alteration of existing rules.
123. The House Committee on Intelligence Report, H.R. REP'. No. 831 pt. 1, supra note 36, did
refer to the state secrets privilege, arguing that it could not be applied to criminal trials. See supra
note 53. The state secrets privilege is distinct from the Roviaro balancing approach. Under the state
secrets privilege, the information is presumed to outweigh the interests of the defendant. For an argu-
ment that such a privilege should attach in CIPA cases, see Tamanaha, supra note 18, at 315-24.
124. E.g., Pringle, 751 F.2d at 426; Government's Preliminary Statement 14, 17, United States v.
Clegg, No. CR83-51R (W.D. Wash.), affd, 740 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1984); see United States v. Mori-
son, 844 F.2d 1057, 1078 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir.
1988).
125. There is no reason to believe that the prejudicial effect of national security concerns would




Upon a request for classified documents, the trial judge should deter-
mine if the requested materials relate to a cognizable defense."' 6 The
judge should request the government to provide the court with the classi-
fied documents if the materials reasonably can be expected to relate to the
defense, and should be authorized to levy sanctions against the prosecution
for failure to produce the material to the court. The judge should review
the classified information in camera with no party before it. If the judge
determines that the material is not relevant to the defense under normal
standards of discovery,12 the defense motion to compel production should
be denied. 2 The court should not inquire into the national security dam-
age that discovery could cause.
2. Level Two: Discovery Determination
This stage of the discovery proceedings should function in a manner
similar to the present approach taken under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(d)(1). If the court determines that the material would be
helpful to the defense, it should entertain, ex parte and in camera, gov-
ernment submission of reasons why the information should not be dis-
closed to the defendant.' 2 The government should also be permitted to
offer substitutions of and stipulations to the relevant information in the
classified materials."' The court, in reviewing the alternatives, should
consider the harm that discovery would cause. The defendant may view
the substitutions offered by the government, but should not see the under-
lying documents.1 3' The court should be permitted to balance the govern-
ment's interest in nondisclosure with the defendant's need for discovery
when creating alternative disclosures.13 2 The court should retain the
power to revoke any of its findings of adequacy of substitutions if it later
finds that the defendant's need for nondisclosed material outweighs the
government's interest in protecting the material.133 The material can be
126. This is the essence of the discovery standards set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963) (exculpatory evidence) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (documents material to preparation
of defense). The defendant should be permitted to provide the court with the reasons why the re-
quested materials are relevant to the preparation of a defense.
127. Government privilege, for example, would not be considered at this stage.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1007 (1983); United States v. Berg, 643 F. Supp. 1472, 1481 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), reconsideration de-
nied, 658 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
129. This aspect of the proposal is analogous to the classification affidavit currently permitted
under § 6(c).
130. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 4.
131. CIPA provides for protective orders to prevent disclosure of discovered classified information.
18 U.S.C. app. § 3. By providing the defendant with access to the substitutions, the defendant may be
able to argue for more helpful disclosures and play an active role in the process.
132. Of course, this is not an unlimited privilege, as Roviaro made clear. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
133. This allows for the development of defenses as the prosecution proceeds and for maintenance
of flexibility in the defendant's case posture. Cf Tamanaha, supra note 18, at 310-11 (expressing
need for flexibility in defense development).
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used to prepare a defense, but is not necessarily admissible. Should the
defendant wish to use the discovered classified information at trial, the
defendant should be required to notify the government under section 5 of
CIPA.
As in the admissibility arena, the key safeguard for the defendant under
this proposal lies in the bifurcated character of the process. The court
should not consider the classified status of the materials until relevance
has been established."' Then the government may explain to the judge
why the information is classified. The court may then shape alternatives
to full disclosure of the materials to the defendant, but the judge's initial
ruling concerning relevance will not be tainted by the potential threats to
national security.
CONCLUSION
CIPA undoubtedly decreases the chance that prosecutions involving
classified information will be aborted for fear of damaging disclosures.135
It may slow the progress of trials, but if used as suggested here, CIPA
will provide for procedural guidelines that facilitate the accommodation of
national security and due process concerns. Rejection of the Smith and
Zettl rationale and modification of CIPA discovery procedures are critical
steps towards applying CIPA in a manner that will minimize graymail
while securing fair trials for defendants.
134. in an internal memo, the CIA suggested a litigation strategy that appears to be somewhat
consistent with the approach forwarded here. The memo stated that attorneys in any CIPA case
should "first argue regular discovery issues on the classified information, i.e., rule 16 and Brady [v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] issues, if there is any doubt as to whether the classified information is
discoverable. If the Government loses on those issues, it can invoke section 4 and submit an in camera
ex parte submission [sic]." Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, Experiences
Under the Classified Information Procedures Act 10 (May 2, 1984) (emphasis in original) (internal
memorandum) (on file at Yale Law Journal).
135. E.g., United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1986) (court affirmed conviction of
espionage in proceedings using CIPA); the Wilson cases, supra note 16; see Groner, supra note 2, at
4, col.1.
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